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Hold Your Nose and Vote

Hold Your Nose and Vote »

Article

Source: Hold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?

Volume/Issue: 2009/83

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Marco Pani

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2009

ISBN: 9781451872309

Keywords: Political Equilibrium, Public Expenditure, Constitution, voter, law, law enforcement, voters, election,

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of rep...

Hold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?

Hold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? »

Journal Issue

Volume/Issue: 2009/83

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Marco Pani

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2009

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451872309.001

ISBN: 9781451872309

Keywords: Political Equilibrium, Public Expenditure, Constitution, voter, law, law enforcement, voters, election,

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of rep...