Browse

You are looking at 1 - 4 of 4 items :

  • Civics and Citizenship x
Clear All
Hold Your Nose and Vote

Hold Your Nose and Vote »

Source: Hold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?

Volume/Issue: 2009/83

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Marco Pani

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2009

ISBN: 9781451872309

Keywords: Political Equilibrium, Public Expenditure, Constitution, voter, law, law enforcement, voters, election,

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of rep...

Hold Your Nose and Vote
			: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?

Hold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? »

Volume/Issue: 2009/83

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Marco Pani

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 April 2009

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451872309.001

ISBN: 9781451872309

Keywords: Political Equilibrium, Public Expenditure, Constitution, voter, law, law enforcement, voters, election,

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of rep...

Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government

Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government »

Volume/Issue: 2000/174

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jan-Peter Olters

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 October 2000

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451858686.001

ISBN: 9781451858686

Keywords: Party programs, median delegates, elections, public goods, political parties, political party, voters, election, voting

Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the “economic model of politics” proposes a public choice approach, which does no...

Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government

Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government »

Source: Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government

Volume/Issue: 2000/174

Series: IMF Working Papers

Author(s): Jan-Peter Olters

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Publication Date: 01 October 2000

ISBN: 9781451858686

Keywords: Party programs, median delegates, elections, public goods, political parties, political party, voters, election, voting

Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the “economic model of politics” proposes a public choice approach, which does no...