Information about Asia and the Pacific Asia y el Pacífico
Journal Issue
Share
Article

India: Selected Issues

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund
Published Date:
February 2006
Share
  • ShareShare
Information about Asia and the Pacific Asia y el Pacífico
Show Summary Details

III. India—Medium-Term Directions for Tax Reform1

A. Introduction and Overview

1. Tax reform figures prominently in India’s plans for fiscal consolidation and to generate fiscal space for infrastructure investment. The Indian government has devoted considerable effort to developing a tax reform strategy: the 2003 Kelkar Task Force laid out a strategy for direct and indirect taxation and the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Managament Act (FRBMA) roadmap and Twelfth Finance Commission report (Government of India, 2004a, 2004b) both explained how reform could contribute to fiscal adjustment. Increases in revenue are expected to contribute almost 3 percent of GDP in fiscal adjustment at the center, and about 1 percent of GDP in the states, permitting 1½ percent of GDP in extra annual investment at the general government level.

2. International experience has shown that revenue-based consolidation strategies can be successful, but are a more difficult route to take. The previous literature on fiscal consolidation had emphasized expenditure-based adjustment (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). More recent work has cast a more positive light on revenue-based experiences (Gupta et al, 2004 and IMF, 2004), especially when a country begins its adjustment at a low initial revenue-to-GDP ratio and has developed well-defined tax reform plans which are phased in gradually (as in India at present). However, successful revenue-based consolidations are less common than expenditure-based consolidations even at low revenue levels, mainly reflecting administrative constraints. Countries have also had more difficulties protecting revenue-based gains against new revenue erosions and expenditure incursions.2

3. To date, India’s revenue strategy has shown some success. Measures have been passed to broaden the corporate income tax base, efforts have been made to improve tax administration, and after many years of negotiations and planning, a state level VAT has been introduced. Early returns from the VAT have been encouraging, with half-year 2005/06 indirect tax receipts up by close to 15 percent in those states implementing it. Growth in corporate income tax and personal income tax collections have been enough of late to offset the drag to revenues from continuing trade tax reforms; since 1993, the average effective tariff rate has dropped from 34 percent to 17 percent, and trade related revenues have fallen by 1 percent of GDP. (Figure III.1).

Figure III.1.India: General Government Revenue and Deficit

(In percent of GDP)

4. The time is ripe in India for further tax reform. To meet FRBMA deficit reduction targets, the center must yet raise its gross tax collection ratio by another 2½ percent of GDP, to a little over 13 percent of GDP, by 2008/09.. With progress on some planned measures behind schedule, and sizable spending commitments on the horizon, new measures may need to be identified. Past studies have emphasized that tax reforms undertaken at a measured pace within a stable macroeconomic environment—the present situation in India—stand a greater chance of success. This paper looks at India’s tax reform options in more detail. Section B looks at India’s revenue performance in international perspective to identify areas of potential collection gains. Section C considers India’s existing tax reform strategy, noting where gaps remain. Section D discusses an important gap: the level of the personal income tax threshold. Section E then discusses how base broadening reforms could be reinvigorated.

B. India’s Revenue Performance in International Perspective

5. International comparisons provide insight into India’s revenue collection effort, and directions for future reforms. In selecting comparators, account must be taken of several factors which are key for establishing taxable capacity: (i) per capita income adjusted for purchasing power parity (it is infeasible to tax a subsistence level of income); (ii) the structure of output (certain sectors like agriculture are. difficult to tax); and (iii) openness to trade and capital flows (a more open economy faces more mobile tax bases). From an administrative angle, it is also important to consider population—the challenge of efficiently administering a tax system grows at least in proportion with the number of taxpayers.

6. It is useful to consider two groups of comparators for India. In the first group are countries in India’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-adjusted per capita income range which are also broadly similar to India in terms of economic structure (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam). In the second group are countries whose structural characteristics place them at a more advanced state of development (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine). Table III.1 highlights the differences between these two samples.

Table III.1.India and Other Economies: Socio-Economic Characteristics
IncomeOutput Structureglobal IntegrationInfrastructure
PPP GNIRankDistrib.AgriServicesGoodsCapitalFDIPowerMobiles
per capita(of 208)(GINI)(%GDP)(%GDP)%GDP%GDP%GDP(cons pc)(per 1000)
Population20032003200320032003200320022003
India1,0912,88014632.522.850.721.13.10.838025
Comparators
China1,2884,98011944.715.033.060.114.34.5987215
Egypt683,94013234.416.050.020.78.60.31,07384
Indonesia2153,21014234.317.040.044.94.01.741187
Pakistan1482,04015933.023.053.030.32.80.736318
Phillipines824,64012846.114.053.094.339.90.6459270
Sri Lanka193,74013633.219.055.064.72.41.429773
Vietnam812,49015137.0115.05.84.037434
Average 1/823,57737.517.347.361.411.11.9566112
Mature EMs
Brazil1777,5108659.36.075.025.16.72.11,776264
Colombia456,4109757.612.058.033.812.63.4817141
Mexico1028,9808054.64.070.054.95.42.01,660291
Russia1438,9508231.05.061.048.219.65.04,291249
South Africa4610,1307657.84.065.048.56.11.03,860364
Turkey716,7109440.013.065.048.26.80.91,458394
Ukraine485,43011229.014.046.093.114.22.92,229136
Average 1/717,73147.08.362.950.310.22.52,299263
Source: World Bank; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Median for population.

Source: World Bank; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Median for population.

7. India’s revenue collections compare very favorably to the first group of comparators (Table III.2). Total general government revenues exceed the level realized in direct comparators by almost 2 percent of GDP. The higher performance is mainly due to indirect taxation (sales taxes and excises). India is very much in line with income tax, customs and nontax revenue collection efforts in these other countries. This good performance is not driven by comparisons against the weakest members of the group—India outperforms both China and Philippines, the two highest income comparators in the group.

8. However, against more mature emerging markets, there are some revealing differences (Table III.2). These more advanced economies collect some 13 percent of GDP more in general government revenues than India does. The largest difference concerns payroll (social contribution) levies: all but one of the comparators has a formal social security system funded in this way while India does not. Other key differences include income taxation, including an almost 3 percentage point gap in the PIT, and goods and service taxation, where the gap is about 2½ percent of GDP. India collects a little less in nontax revenues, perhaps reflecting more efficient use of state assets elsewhere.

Table III.2.India and Other Economies: General Government Revenues(In percent of GDP)
IncomeGoods and ServicesInternationalSocial
TotalTaxTotalPITCITPropertyTotalVATExcisesTradeContributionsOtherGrantsNontax
India20.3016.865.021.753.280.748.651.760.000.680.093.90
Comparators
China19.4117.644.331.272.890.5710.856.740.760.001.130.001.78
Egypt20.5414.176.142.273.870.035.442.481.121.501.060.000.535.34
Indonesia17.9912.476.321.384.940.614.913.151.770.540.000.080.025.50
Pakistan14.4510.022.800.402.400.155.323.661.251.760.000.000.304.13
Phillipines17.6614.855.763.052.710.446.102.881.590.971.580.000.002.81
Sri Lanka16.4414.612.041.220.820.199.576.233.242.020.170.620.431.40
Vietnam22.7016.505.700.505.200.048.205.901.802.600.000.000.206.00
Average18.4614.324.731.443.260.297.204.431.791.450.400.260.213.85
Mature EMs
Brazil33.6229.755.6610.528.710.4812.300.803.86
Colombia30.1320.286.139.825.822.870.872.740.729.86
Mexico26.0519.505.673.322.350.319.913.841.840.413.380.090.006.55
Russia38.6136.088.623.435.1911.036.391.475.137.833.460.002.53
South Africa24.9524.3513.637.715.490.409.537.122.410.990.000.790.000.60
Turkey39.6732.907.755.152.611.1315.918.156.630.286.791.070.006.77
Ukraine39.7433.9110.064.155.910.6611.166.672.351.778.711.560.005.83
Average33.2528.118.224.754.310.6311.136.672.931.425.961.210.005.14
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

9. Part of the difference against mature emerging markets will disappear over time as the structure of India’s economy shifts. If the share of agriculture in Indian output were to fall by 13 percentage points in favor of manufacturing and services (which would move its economic structure into line with more mature emerging markets), this could yield close to 1 percent of GDP in additional revenue. However, it would take a long time for this shift in economic structure to occur—20 years, given the present differential between agricultural and non-agricultural growth rates. And there would still be a large gap in total revenues relative to the mature emerging markets if nothing else in the tax system changed.

C. Medium-Term Directions and Strategies for Tax Reform

10. There are good prospects for India to further raise its revenue ratio by strengthening both goods and services and income taxation. In fact, plans are already well laid out in India for reform of goods and services taxation, and many aspects of the PIT and CIT reform agenda have also been identified. The thrust of the proposals, consistent with international experience of successful tax reform episodes, is to broaden tax bases.

Goods and Services Taxation

11. There is already a general strategy to address indirect tax shortfalls. The Kelkar Commission report and FRBMA roadmap both highlighted the need to move towards a broad-based and integrated goods and services tax.3 Key steps include: (i) extending the state level VAT to all states, and incorporating services into the base; (ii) eliminating the tax on interstate trade (the CST); (iii) expanding the service tax base at the center (for instance, to incorporate further financial and legal services); (iv) integrating the central VAT and services tax into a new central level goods and services tax (GST) applied at the retail stage; (v) broadening the GST base by eliminating exemptions (including for small scale industries and specific regions); and (vi) introducing a comprehensive goods and services tax (having a common base at the central and state level, but allowing rates to be fixed separately, subject to some limitations).4 The government is already moving forward on several of these steps.

12. There is ample opportunity, in moving to a broad-based GST, to close the revenue gap with more mature emerging markets. In general, international experience has shown that the introduction of a VAT often leads to higher revenues due to base broadening and compliance improvements (IMF, 2004; World Bank, 1997). Looking more specifically at India, estimates suggest that eliminating exemptions for small scale industries and for specific regions could generate an additional ¼ percent of GDP in annual revenue (Bagchi et al., 2005). Expanding the service tax base could alone generate 1 percent of GDP (FRBMA report). In terms of compliance, the sharp distinction in India between a good and service along with the availability of scale and location based exemptions have given companies an incentive to reorganize production and distribution processes to minimize taxes. This has led to many drawn out disputes with the tax authorities, and to complicated and costly-to-administer rules for imputing taxable values. There is thus much scope for compliance based revenue gains, although the precise amount and timing would be difficult to predict.5

13. An integrated GST is best viewed, however, as a medium-term reform. Some steps would involve difficult center-state negotiations; for instance, elimination of the CST would produce winners and losers among the states (depending on whether they are net exporters to other states), raising issues of compensation. Others, like service taxation at the state level, involve constitutional issues. Even once these impediments are overcome, international experience has shown that implementing a full GST can take substantial lead time, in order to put in place appropriate administrative arrangements and to train taxpayers. The challenge is magnified for India, given the need to put in place a system of joint or unified audit and establish channels for adequate information exchange between different tax administrations. Taking adequate time to get this right is crucial. Unprepared administrations could face significant revenue leakages, to the detriment of public support for the VAT. At the same time, if taxpayers have difficulty complying with changes, pressures for reversal of reform could become intense (World Bank, 1989; World Bank, 1997).

Personal Income Taxation

14. India has already reformed key elements of its personal income tax regime. In the 2005/06 budget, thresholds were increased dramatically, rates were lowered modestly, and a variety of savings related exemptions were consolidated into one deduction. The government is now considering modalities for taxing withdrawals from small savings funds.6 Small savings incentives cost the government in the range of ¼ percent of GDP annually in foregone income tax revenue (Government of India, 2003a). However, the FRBMA roadmap suggested grandfathering many existing savings schemes, which would limit near-term revenue gains.

15. There remain important base broadening measures, however, that the Indian authorities could take. These would not be easy—well-organized vested interests would need to be confronted—but could yield between ⅔ percent and ¾ percent of GDP per annum:

  • Tightening the tax treatment of charities. Charities are generally exempt from taxes when they perform activities of social value that are not for profit. At present in India, however, trusts carry on many activities that are for profit, and surveys have suggested that business income may represent 50–60 percent of their total income. This leads to revenue losses of almost 0.2 percent of GDP per year and distorts competition and horizontal equity (Bagchi et al., 2005).
  • Subjecting agricultural income to taxation.7 Besides creating horizontal equity problems, the exemption has led to significant evasion. High administrative and compliance costs could provide a rationale for some special treatment, but the present high income tax threshold in India (see below), which would eliminate all small and many medium-sized farmers, already accommodates this concern.8 The exemption is estimated to cost ¼ percent of GDP per year (Bagchi et al., 2005).
  • Eliminating the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. This deduction raises issues of vertical equity—high income taxpayers who face higher marginal tax rates receive a larger benefit—and distorts investment incentives.9 Its elimination could bring an additional 0.2 percent of GDP per year in revenue (Government of India, 2003a).

16. India’s high income tax threshold would also restrain the growth of revenues over the medium term, but addressing this is not part of the current reform strategy. Compared to PIT systems in more mature emerging markets, India’s threshold for income taxation is very high relative to per capita income, even adjusting for different deductions available (Table III.3).10 The amount of tax revenue foregone may be significant: perhaps 1⅓ percent of GDP.11 The PIT threshold has just been raised in India, breaking a long decline over the past 40 years relative to average income (Figure III.2). Section D considers the threshold issue in more detail.

Table III.3.India and Other Economies: Structure of the Personal Income Tax System
RevenueRatesThresholds 1/
(%GDP)No.Min.Max.SurchargeMin. rateMax. rateSocial 2/
India1.753.0010.030.010315788631
Mature EMs
Brazil2.0015.027.5132264237
Colombiamany35.001,4740
Mexico3.325.003.032.07124121
Russia3.431.0013.013.04443
South Africa7.716.0018.040.01201,030135
Turkey5.154.0015.035.0067844
Ukraine4.151.0013.013.0333360
Average4.753.1712.827.94251591
Other
China1.279.005.045.0184678
Philippines3.057.005.032.017861
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2003b; and IMF.

In percent of per capita GDP.

For a married taxpayer with two children earning the per capita income, and taking advantage of all savings, dependent and education deductions.

Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2003b; and IMF.

In percent of per capita GDP.

For a married taxpayer with two children earning the per capita income, and taking advantage of all savings, dependent and education deductions.

Figure III.2.India: Evolution of the PIT Threshold

Sources: Kelkar Report; and IMF staff estimates.

Corporate Income Taxation

17. Many aspects of India’s corporate tax regime are now in line with international practice, but low revenue productivity signals too narrow a base. India’s corporate tax rate remains high, but it has done a good deal of late to bring its other CIT provisions in line with international practice (Table III.4). However, even with these changes, the productivity of the corporate tax lags more mature emerging markets (Figure III.3). This signals significant leakage through exemptions, and India does maintain extensive tax holidays, including for export related activities, specific sectors and regions. The direct cost of holidays for regions, exports and the construction sector alone has been estimated at some ½ percent of GDP (Bagchi et al., 2005), and there is little evidence that these holidays have generated significant investment or employment.12 One result of excessive leakage in India has been a proliferation of other corporate taxes in India (e.g., the minimum tax and wealth tax), which complicate the tax system and raise administration and compliance costs. Recent practice in more mature emerging markets has been to reduce or eliminate tax holidays.13

Table III.4.India and Other Economies: Structure of the Corporate Income Tax System
LossInvestment Incentives
RevenueMinimumCarryDeprec.LowerAccel.Inc. Tax
(%GDP)Rate 1/TaxForward 2/Rate 3/CIT RateDeprec.Holidays
India3.2833.07.5815NoYesYes
Mature EMs
Brazil25.5Nonlim (cap)10 to 20NoYesYes
Colombia36.7Yes8 (cap)10NoYesYes
Mexico2.3532.01.810YesYesNo
Russia5.1924.0No10 (cap)5 to 100YesYesNo
South Africa5.4930.0Nonlim20NoYesNo
Turkey2.6130.0No56.6 to 50NoYesYes
Ukraine5.9125.0Nonlim24 to 40NoNoNo
Average4.3129.0
Other
China2.8933.0No810NoNoYes
Philippines2.7132.02.03NoNoYes
Sources: Price Waterhouse Coopers; and IMF.

Including surcharges.

Number of years; “nlim” denotes no limit; “cap” indicates that the amount in any one year is capped.

Machinery and equipment, under straight line method.

Sources: Price Waterhouse Coopers; and IMF.

Including surcharges.

Number of years; “nlim” denotes no limit; “cap” indicates that the amount in any one year is capped.

Machinery and equipment, under straight line method.

Figure III.3.Productivity of the CIT 1/

Sources: Country authorities; and IM F staff estimates.

1/ Productivity defined as collections (in percent of GDP) per each percentage point of tax rate.

18. The need to broaden the corporate tax base has long been recognized in India. The Kelkar Report and FRBMA roadmap (Government of India, 2003a and 2004a) advocated the removal of tax holidays and discussed options including upfront elimination, a rapid 2–3 year phase-out, and sunset clauses with no new entrants. Time-consistency would argue in favor of the first option: a phase out would allow vested interests to lobby for continuation. The government has been pursuing the third route, but some setbacks are evident: in the 2005/06 budget, exemptions covering research and development facilities in specific sectors and investments in Jammu and Kashmir were extended by two years. A key issue, considered in Section E, is how to create an environment in which base broadening measures would stand more of a chance of success.

D. The Income Tax Threshold

19. Elaborating a strategy to increase the PIT threshold over the medium term should be a focus for the Indian authorities. International experience suggests that having well specified tax reform plans is important: sudden political or economic events often provide an unexpected impetus to reform.14 Doing nothing would allow inflation to erode the threshold (so-called “bracket creep”), but this would require 25 years to bring the threshold into line with the average in more mature emerging markets. Moreover, without an explicit strategy, there is a significant risk that the threshold will eventually be raised again, leaving the problem in place even as India develops into a more mature emerging market.

20. Several arguments have been put forward in India in favor of a high threshold:15

  • Tax administration constraints. Due to resource constraints and organizational shortcomings the tax administration is unable to effectively challenge taxpayer’ declarations, allowing them to under declare income. They tend to do so at levels just above the threshold, and thus a higher threshold may even enhance revenues.
  • High compliance costs for taxpayers. These raise the social cost of extracting resources from the private sector. Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002) have estimated compliance costs in India to be well above those in developed countries.
  • Social considerations. There is no formal social security system in India, so that India may require a higher level of exemption to self insure.
  • The high level of indirect taxation relative to comparable developing countries. A higher threshold may ensure that the effective rate of tax on labor (i.e., including consumption taxes) is reasonable in India for low income earners.

21. The arguments in favor of a high threshold are less compelling from a medium-term perspective. Tax administration reforms, for instance the expansion of the taxpayer identification number (TDS system), computerization, introduction of a large taxpayer unit, and expanded collection of third party information, should strengthen tax administration. The information technology revolution should at the same time rapidly reduce compliance costs for taxpayers. In addition, the government has prioritized the enhancement of social spending over the medium term, and is introducing additional elements of a safety net. Finally, in the medium term, India will join the ranks of more mature emerging markets, and compared to them, its level of income taxation lags.

22. Improvements in tax administration and better targeted social spending could open the door to a change in the threshold. As administrative and compliance costs fall and the government becomes more effective at redistributing income, political opposition could lessen. A formal social security system funded by a payroll tax is not necessarily needed but, if India does follow the lead of more mature emerging markets and introduces one, the payroll tax could promote better compliance, given the benefit motivation for payroll tax payment and the administrative synergies in payroll tax and PIT collection.

E. Minimizing Tax Exemptions

23. International experience suggests that base broadening should remain a key thrust of reform efforts. International experience shows that improvements in simplicity and horizontal equity (fairness) proved to be strong selling points in generating public support for tax reform; vertical equity and economic efficiency did not (World Bank, 1997). Moreover, tax base broadening also seems to be associated with successful revenue-based fiscal consolidation episodes, perhaps due to improved efficiency and macroeconomic outcomes (IMF, 2004).16

24. To promote a broader tax base, many emerging markets have become more transparent about their tax expenditures (Table III.5). Indeed, in some cases this seems to have had a direct impact on subsequent policy (e.g., Ukraine).17 The Kelkar commission and FRBMA roadmap recognized the importance of transparency about tax expenditures, and the Ministry of Finance has been working on estimates for major items. Box III.1 discusses the key issues to consider in this process.

Table III.5.Reporting of Tax Expenditures
CountryReporting Practice
IndiaNo
ChinaNo
PhilippinesPartial
BrazilYes
ColombiaNo
MexicoYes
RussiaPartial
South AfricaNo
TurkeyYes
UkraineYes
KoreaYes
G-7All except Japan 1/
Source: IMF Fiscal ROSCs.

Italy’s reporting is partial.

Source: IMF Fiscal ROSCs.

Italy’s reporting is partial.

Box III.1.Enhancing Transparency About Tax Expenditures

Improving transparency about tax expenditures requires consideration of several issues (Craig and Allan, 2001):

  • Definitions. The two most commonly used approaches are the conceptual and reference law approaches. In the former, tax expenditures are defined relative to a pure theoretical baseline (e.g., a single rate VAT). In the latter, only exemptions relative to the existing tax law are considered (e.g., lower rate of VAT would not be considered a tax expenditure). The conceptual approach produces the widest accounting, but should be tempered to reflect administrative feasibility.
  • Measurement. The standard approach is to focus only on the reduction of tax liability and to avoid assumptions about a behavioral response. Estimation can be done using survey or other data, but over time tax forms and filing requirements can be adapted to permit more exact measurement. A de minimis rule—the exclusion of small items—can be used to reduce the administrative burden of measurement.
  • Publication. The budget documents should ideally include information covering the past 2 years, plus the projection, and should distinguish any new initiatives. The documents should spell out the estimation methodology and discuss the risks to revenues, and budget implementation, from misestimation.
  • Ex post assessment and audit. Standard compliance audit is appropriate, but value-for-money audit is crucial. The Auditor General should ask whether the instrument achieved the policy goal. If this is not feasible, specialized studies can be undertaken, as has been done in India for tax holidays in the northeastern region. Any assessment should be published.

25. Maintaining a broad tax base also requires careful administration. Budget process controls are important and are reasonable in India: the MoF is required to vet and cost all new tax expenditure proposals and can propose alternative modalities for delivering support (e.g., on-budget subsidies). Moreover, the FRBMA in India effectively requires that new measures with a cost be compensated elsewhere. However, the system has failed in practice to stem the flow, and recent legislation on special economic zones evolved to include extensive tax holiday provisions. An option to exert greater control would be to make all steps of the process more transparent, including what would now be internal MoF deliberations on alternative subsidy mechanisms.

26. To protect CIT revenues, India may also need to address risks from harmful international tax competition. As India enters into bilateral and regional free trade arrangements, and companies are able to supply the Indian domestic market from other locations, the various jurisdictions may compete for mobile tax bases.18 Tax coordination can help to reduce the extent of competition. The least intrusive form would be a non-binding code of conduct (as in the EU). More developed forms would involve agreement on tax floors and on acceptable incentives (see Keen, 2005 and Easson, 2004).

F. Conclusions

27. There is ample room for further revenue gains in India. The introduction of a GST, reduction of income tax thresholds, extension of income tax to the agricultural sector, and elimination of corporate tax exemptions would go a long way to raising India’s revenue ratio over the medium term, to achieve revenue collection performance on par with more mature emerging markets (Table III.6).

Table III.6.India: Summary of Key Revenue Reforms
MeasurePotential Yield
(Percent of GDP)
Goods and services taxation1.25
Broaden service tax base1.00
Eliminate exemptions0.25
Compliance improvementLarge
Personal income taxation2.25
Tax agriculture 1/0.25
Tighten treatment of charities0.20
Mortgage interest deduction0.20
Interest exemptions0.25
Raise threshold 2/1.35
Corporate income taxation0.50
Eliminate exemptions0.50
Total4.00
Source: Bagchi (2005), Government of India (2003); and IMF staff estimates.

Yield at existing income tax threshold.

Including agriculture.

Source: Bagchi (2005), Government of India (2003); and IMF staff estimates.

Yield at existing income tax threshold.

Including agriculture.

28. Moving difficult reforms forward in India requires some thought about strategy. Fiscal federal agreements would be needed to secure a full GST and agricultural income taxation, while PIT reform would likely gain traction with improvements in the social safety net and tax administration reform. Corporate tax reforms may benefit from improvements in transparency, and from efforts to ensure appropriate tax coordination.

References

    AggarwalAradhna2004“Export Processing Zones in India: Analysis of the Export Performance,”ICRIER Working Paper No. 148(New Delhi:ICRIER).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    AlesinaAlberto and R.Perotti1996“Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects,”NBER Working paper 5730(Cambridge:National Bureau of Economic Research).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    BagchiAmareshR.K.Rao and B.Sen2005“Raising the Tax-Ratio by Reining in the “Tax Breaks,””(New Delhi:National Institute for Public Finance).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    BirdRichard and P.P.Gendron2005“VAT Revisited: A New Look at the Value Added Tax in Developing and Transition Countries,”paper presented at the USAID Workshop for Practitioners on Tax on May 4, 2005,(Washington:USAID).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    ChattopadhyaySaumen and A.Das-Gupta2002“The Compliance Cost of the Personal Income Tax and its Determinants,”(New Delhi:National Institute for Public Finance).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    CraigJon and WilliamAllan2001“Fiscal Transparency, Tax Expenditures, and Budget Processes: An International Perspective,”Proceedings of the Ninety Fourth Annual Conference 2000,pp. 258–64(Washington:National Tax Association).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    EassonAlex2004“Harmful Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD Initiative,”Tax Notes International(June 7)pp. 1037–1077(Falls Church, Virginia:Tax Analysts).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    Government of India2005Budget 2005–06(New Delhi).

    Government of India2003aReport of the Task Force on Direct Taxation,(New Delhi).

    Government of India2003bReport of the Task Force on Indirect Taxation,(New Delhi).

    Government of India2004aReport of the Task Force on Implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility and Management Act, 2003(New Delhi).

    Government of India2004bReport of the Twelfth Finance Commission(New Delhi).

    GuptaSanjeevB.ClementsE.Baldacci and C.Mulas-Granados2004“The Persistence of Fiscal Adjustment in Developing Countries,”Applied Economics LettersVol. 11No. 4pp. 209–212(Oxford:Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group Ltd.).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    International Monetary Fund2004“Experience with Large Fiscal Adjustments,”(forthcoming; Washington:International Monetary Fund).

    KeenMichael2005“Corporate Tax Competition,” mimeo(Washington:International Monetary Fund).

    KhanMahmood2001“Agricultural taxation in developing countries: a survey of issues and policy,”Agricultural EconomicsVol. 24.pp. 315–328(London:Reed Elsevier Plc).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    PoirsonHélène2005“The Tax System in India: Could Reform Spur Growth?” inIndia—Selected IssuesIMF Country Report No. 05/87(Washington:International Monetary Fund).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation

    PricewaterhouseCoopers2003aCorporate Taxes 2004–05: Worldwide Summaries(Ontario, Canada:John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd.).

    PricewaterhouseCoopers2003bIndividual Taxes 2004–05: Worldwide Summaries(Ontario, Canada:John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd.).

    World Bank1997Tax Reform in Developing Countries,ThirskWayne ed. by (Washington).

    World Bank1989Tax Reform in Developing Countries,GillisMalcolm ed. by(Washington).

    ZeeHowellJ.Stotskyand E.Ley2002“Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policymakers in Developing Countries,”World DevelopmentVol. 30.No. 9pp. 1497–1516(London:Reed Elsevier Plc).

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
1Prepared by Mark Flanagan.
2One possibility is that expenditure cutbacks are less reversible, for example if canceling programs permanently weakens the lobby groups promoting them.
3There is also a need to review remaining excises on energy products, alcohol and tobacco. See Chapter I for a discussion of petroleum excise taxation.
4This approach can be characterized as a dual VAT. An alternative approach in a fiscal federal system is the CVAT, which imposes a creditable tax on interstate trade to minimize opportunities for cross-border fraud. See Bird and Gendron (2005) for a discussion of the merits and demerits of each of these approaches.
5The Report of the Task Force on Implementation of the FRBMA (2003) foresaw compliance driven revenue improvements of about ½ percent of GDP through the service tax alone.
6Deposits, withdrawals and interest earned are exempt from taxation; international practice has moved towards exemptions for deposits and interest only (Government of India, 2004a).
7See Bagchi et al. (2005) for a discussion of the arguments in favor of an agricultural exemption, and why they fail in the Indian context.
8The vast majority of developing countries do not exempt agricultural income from taxation (Khan, 2001). However, difficulties in measuring income in the agricultural sector have led to widespread use of presumptive methods of taxation.
9See Government of India, 2003a for a discussion of the pros and cons of the deduction. Among countries surveyed in the Kelkar report, one-half of high income countries, and one-quarter of emerging markets and low income countries had such a provision.
10This is also before accounting for the fact that social considerations are partly built into the threshold in India: it is 25 percent higher for women, and 50 percent higher for retirees. Such a design is uncommon, although South Africa also applies a higher threshold for the aged.
11Calculated using 2003 data, and assuming a threshold of 40 percent of per capita income. Assumes (i) 35 million current taxpayers; and (ii) 70 million new non-agricultural taxpayers with an average income of Rs. 20,000 and savings deductions of Rs. 4,000. Calculations also include agriculture, beyond the value of ending the exemption, and are made using data from Bagchi et al. (2005). The gains should be understood as relevant for the medium term.
12See Bagchi et al (2005). Aggarwal (2004) considers export zones and finds that exports per employment unit declined sharply after a period, as the incentives could not compensate for poor governance and infrastructure in the zones.
13See Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002) for a discussion of the merits and demerits of various types of investment incentives. Income tax holidays are considered to be among the worst. South Africa’s practice—budget subsidies—is an example of a more transparent approach.
14See World Bank (1997). The Ukrainian tax reform in 2005 is perhaps an example of this.
15See, for instance, Government of India, 2004a.
16See Poirson (2005) for a discussion of the growth enhancing impact that a tax base broadening and rate reduction reform could have.
17The Ukrainian authorities began publishing tax expenditure estimates in 2002, and efforts were made to broaden the tax base. Steady successes were followed by sweeping reform in 2005, when a new government sought resources to fund social initiatives.
18In India, before 2001, states competed for investment via incentives and lower tax rates. An agreement in 2001, which set floor rates of sales tax and eliminated some incentives, was widely seen as mitigating the problem. See Twelfth Finance Commission report (2004).

Other Resources Citing This Publication